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Mobilizing Doubt: The Legal Mobilization of Climate Denialist Groups 
Aaron J. Ley 
 
 
 Abstract: The climate change counter-movement (CCCM) deploys a broad repertoire of 
tactics in its effort to cast doubt on the science of climate change. One important yet 
understudied tactic is the effort by CCCM groups to use open records laws in 
scientifically uncertain areas to cast doubt on the accuracy of scientific information. This 
article explores the use of this tactic by CCCM groups and adds to the legal mobilization 
literature in three ways. First, it traces the origin of CCCM groups to the broader 
conservative legal movement of the 1970s that challenged the dominance of the liberal 
legal network. Second, it shows how CCCM groups waged an open records campaign 
against climate scientists in Virginia and Arizona, which caused a countermobilization by 
scientists with their own legal campaigns. Finally, this article provides the first empirical 
evidence of the effect of CCCM FOIA suits on the activities of university researchers. I 
find, through in-depth personal interviews with twelve university researchers, that the 
experience of researchers who have been exposed to open records campaigns has been 
overwhelmingly negative, has caused them to communicate through different media, and 
has imposed a new work burden that draws them away from other work responsibilities. I 
argue that the costs of these tactics are narrowly borne by a concentrated group of 
scientists whose production of knowledge is a public good that allows us to address the 
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 As the Earth warms, the politics of climate change keep getting hotter. In 
1988, renowned climate modeler James E. Hansen sat before the Senate Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources and famously declared that “global warming is 
now large enough that we can ascribe with a high degree of confidence a cause and 
effect relationship to the greenhouse effect.” (Hansen 1988, 2) Twenty-seven years 
later in February 2015, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) brandished a snowball on the 
US Senate floor as evidence that global warming is overblown. The tactics used by 
climate deniers1 like Sen. Inhofe, which range from attracting media attention to 
filing lawsuits to acquire the emails of climate scientists, are part of a broader effort 
that aims to cast doubt on the scientific evidence that supports global warming.   
 An extensive climate change countermovement (CCCM) has emerged to 
challenge the insights generated by scientists who seek to understand more about 
the causes and consequences of global warming. Today’s scientists, together with 
environmentalists who raise public consciousness about the negative effects of 
climate change, represent forces of reflexive modernization (reflexivity) seeking to 
address the multijurisdictional, crosscutting, and relentless problem of climate 
change (see Beck 1992). It has been argued that our mastery of science and its 
application to industrial capitalism has caused new fields of science to emerge, 
called “impact science,” that seek to address the severe environmental 
consequences that are borne by current generations and that threaten to be passed 
on to future ones (McCright and Dunlap 2010). Fields of inquiry that qualify as 
impact science, like climate science, are increasingly being challenged by advocacy 
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organizations and conservative think tanks that, despite their lack of scientific 
credentials, question the legitimacy of climate science as a field and impugn 
individual scientists conducting climate research (Brulle and Dunlap 2015; Dunlap 
and Jacques 2013). This strategy has yielded a large stockpile of contrarian 
information and strategies—veritable field manuals—that are written by 
conservative think tank–sponsored authors and published by conservative presses 
(Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008). A large-scale and 
sophisticated network of conservative commentators disseminate this contrarian 
information through the news media by “employ[ing] arguments against global 
warming that have long been debunked in the scientific literature” and by 
“repeat[ing] allegations against climate scientists that have no basis,” often with 
“virtual impunity” (Elsasser and Dunlap 2012, 14). Recent empirical studies 
demonstrate that these efforts are heavily influenced by corporate benefactors and 
that they powerfully influence the media narrative about climate change (Farrell 
2016a, 2016b). Moreover, it has been shown that donor-directed organizations, 
otherwise known as dark money organizations, serve as the primary funding 
mechanism that allows CCCM activities to persist (Brulle 2014). For McCright and 
Dunlap (2010), all of these activities undertaken by CCCM organizations represent a 
“highly potent force of anti-reflexivity” that seeks to reassert the dominance of the 
industrial capitalist social order by intimidating scientists and manipulating 
research in ways that manufacture doubt. 
 If the production and dissemination of contrarian information to cast doubt 
on climate science research has captured the imagination and attention of scholars 
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as a time-honored tactic of CCCM organizations, then another CCCM strategy that 
deserves equal attention as part of their broader repertoire of tactics is the 
execution of open records campaigns to gain access to the data and correspondence 
of scientists engaged in climate science research. Scholars have long recognized the 
critical importance of legal resources that, once invoked, raise consciousness and 
constitute meaning during the hard-fought policy conflicts waged by everyday 
people making rights-based claims (McCann 1994). Indeed, many of these legal 
resources were forged in earlier battles being fought by liberal public interest 
groups as they challenged the power of corporate influence and sought to open 
administrative policy venues for greater political participation (McCann 1986). 
While much scholarly attention has focused on the legal mobilization strategies and 
tactics of grassroots and social movement organizations that are making rights-
based claims, this manuscript examines the adoption of similar tactics by 
conservative legal groups as they countermobilize against the scientific consensus of 
climate change. In doing so, this paper shows how CCCM organizations with 
corporate ties have reappropriated open records laws and now use them in 
scientifically uncertain and technically complex policy areas to cast doubt on the 
accuracy of information that is communicated to the lay public. These groups are, in 
effect, engaging in the consciousness-lowering tactic of manufacturing uncertainty 
(Michaels 2006), and theories of legal mobilization should begin to take these 
countermobilization efforts into account. I argue that the costs of these tactics, 
especially when they are used instrumentally to interfere or cast doubt on the 
generation of scientific knowledge, are narrowly borne by a concentrated group of 
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scientists whose production of knowledge is a public good that allows us to address 
the crosscutting and relentless problem of climate change.   
Given that procedural rights of access were developed by predominately 
liberal public interest groups to mobilize against corporate power, I am interested 
in learning about the effects of the adoption of these tactics. In this study I trace the 
existence of CCCM legal groups to the broader conservative legal movement that 
emerged to challenge the dominance of the liberal legal network (see Teles 2008). I 
also describe how the formation of CCCM legal groups was followed by the 
execution of two high profile litigation campaigns against Pennsylvania State 
University climate scientist Michael Mann and University of Arizona researchers 
Jonathan Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes. In response to the CCCM legal campaigns 
against Professors Mann, Overpeck, and Hughes, I show how the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), the Union of Concerned Scientists 
(UCS), the Climate Science Legal Defense Fund (CSLDF), and various other actors 
countermobilized in support of climate researchers. Finally, if CCCM legal groups are 
now commonly using legal mobilization campaigns as a strategy to undermine 
reflexivity, then I am interested in the empirical effect of these FOIA campaigns on 
the behavior and experiences of university researchers. In the last section of this 
manuscript, I use personal interviews with climate researchers and other university 
scholars to explore how (and through what means) scholars are communicating 
about their research in the aftermath of these requests. I turn now to the 
development and ascendance of climate denialist legal actors and their links to the 
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broader conservative legal movement, followed by a discussion of the legal 
campaigns against Professors Mann, Hughes, and Overpeck. 
      
II. The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement and the CCCM Legal 
Campaign against Professors Mann, Overpeck, and Hughes. 
 
A. The Conservative Legal Movement and CCCM Organizations. 
Scholars have written extensively about the factors giving rise to the large-
scale rights-based litigation campaigns undertaken by advocacy organizations that 
fought for gender equality and civil rights. These movements witnessed the 
emergence of an institutional support structure of litigants that altered the “supply” 
of cases at all levels of the judiciary (Epp 1998). Without a similar conservative legal 
strategy in place, liberals exploited the judiciary as an underdefended policy terrain 
on which to advance their rights-based claims (Teles 2008). While organizations 
such as the NAACP and ACLU had for years executed a rights-based legal strategy, 
Southworth (2005) observes that public interest law firms had emerged and 
distinguished themselves “by pursuing broader issue agendas and expanding the 
range of strategies to include not only constitutional litigation but also other types 
of law reform litigation and administrative and legislative advocacy” (1234-1235). 
These efforts included passing broad freedom of information and open meetings 
laws to make bureaucracies more transparent and, it was hoped, accountable to the 
people.  
 It was during this time that law schools were built into bona fide producers 
of public goods for a vast network of liberals that sought policy change through the 
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judiciary (Teles 2008). Law schools groomed the next army of public interest 
lawyers by training them through in-house legal clinics, which allowed young 
attorneys to hone their skills before entering the real world of legal conflict against 
experienced corporate attorneys (Teles 2008). Young, energetic, and committed 
public interest lawyers repeatedly pressured the judiciary to force compliance with 
environmental, consumer protection, and workplace protection statutes, and federal 
judges began striking down laws they deemed “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or an “abuse 
of agency discretion” (Shapiro 1988).  
Conservatives, meanwhile, learned that a strategy for competing with liberals 
meant replicating the public interest law model by increasing their presence in law 
schools (Southworth 2005). Wealthy businessmen and chemical manufacturers like 
John M. Olin were constantly embroiled in conflict with administrative agencies that 
were now pressured by newly graduated public interest lawyers to zealously 
regulate. Olin directed his foundation to begin funding programs to bolster the 
presence of conservatives in higher education and, especially, in law schools, where 
his foundation supported the establishment of “beachheads” for conservative 
intellectuals. Another part of the Olin Foundation strategy was to deliver support for 
conservative intellectuals by funding the establishment of programs in Law and 
Economics—a legal philosophy that directly challenged the liberal legal paradigm—
at some of the nation’s most elite law schools (Mayer 2016). Another important 
national development occurred when numerous small chapters of the Federalist 
Society were formed, allowing conservative ideas to begin gaining more traction in 
American law schools. The institutionalization of the Federalist Society gave young 
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conservatives more opportunities to articulate their ideas through debate, brought 
what at the time seemed to be off-the-wall legal ideas into the mainstream, and 
allowed young conservatives to network with one another (Hollis-Brusky 2015; 
Teles 2008). 
 Arguably the Olin Foundation’s most important strategy was establishing 
beachheads for conservative legal intellectuals where institutional resources could 
be used to train a new generation of legal activists on how to mobilize law in 
support of the industrial capitalist order. One of the most widely recognized 
sanctuaries for legal conservatives is the George Mason University School of Law 
(GMUSL), now named the Antonin Scalia Law School. GMUSL was made prominent 
by Henry Manne whose advocacy for the establishment of Law and Economics 
training programs for students and practitioners was felt at law schools throughout 
the country (Teles 2008). Many viewed Law and Economics, built on the neo-
classical economic model, as a theoretically elegant vehicle for institutionalizing and 
justifying free market capitalism in ways that were attractive to law students and 
practitioners, like judges, who commonly attended Law and Economics seminars. 
Stephen Teles (2008) described Henry Manne as, 
…. [having been] able to build a law school [GMUSL] with a durable 
libertarian character. The ideological coloration of the school allowed 
it to actively seek to advance the interests of the larger conservative-
libertarian movement, by providing an institutional space in which 
scholars out of the legal academic mainstream can develop a scholarly 
reputation and move on to higher-status institutions (219).  
 
Today, GMUSL provides students with clinical opportunities and program centers 
that owe their existence to conservative donors such as DonorsTrust, a 501(c)3 
organization that finances climate denialist groups and “was established . . . to 
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ensure the intent of donors who are dedicated to the ideals of limited government, 
personal responsibility, and free enterprise.”2 The law school also provides students 
opportunities to gain clinical experience through conservative public interest law 
clinics such as the George Mason Environmental Law Clinic, which was later 
renamed The Free Market Environmental Law Clinic after dissociating from the 
university.3 One of the most prominent associates of the Free Market Environmental 
Law Clinic was its former Director David Schnare, who became a key part of 
President Donald Trump’s EPA Transition Team and maintained a relationship with 
the American Tradition Institute (ATI), the organization that brought lawsuits 
against prominent climate researcher Michael Mann for access to his emails.  
    
B. The American Tradition Institute vs. Michael Mann and the 
University of Virginia 
 
 Michael Mann is internationally known for his research that culminated in 
the “Hockey Stick” graph, which demonstrates a precipitous rise in twentieth 
century temperature caused by human activity (Mann et al. 1998, 1999). Mann, the 
recipient of numerous honors and awards for his research, began his academic 
career at the University of Virginia, where he was an Assistant Professor in the 
Department of Environmental Sciences from 1999 to 2005. In 2010, after Mann had 
accepted a position with Pennsylvania State University, Republican Virginia 
Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, a self-described climate skeptic, filed a civil 
investigative demand for emails related to Mann’s work. A civil investigative 
demand allows the Attorney General to subpoena materials from state agencies to 
investigate fraud. After the request was made, UVA signaled that the university 
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would comply with it, but then opposition formed from groups such as the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), causing UVA administrators to reconsider the university’s position. Later, 
the UVA Faculty Senate approved a formal message in support of Michael Mann, 
stating that  
[Cuccinelli’s] action and the potential threat of legal prosecution of 
scientific endeavor that has satisfied peer-review standards sends a 
chilling message to scientists engaged in basic research involving 
Earth’s climate and indeed to any scholars in any discipline. Such 
actions directly threaten academic freedom and, thus, our ability to 
generate the knowledge upon which informed public policy relies 
(Mann 2012, p. 238-239).   
 
That next month, UVA challenged Cuccinelli in state court and won, successfully 
demonstrating that the Attorney General lacked evidence that Mann was engaged in 
fraud, but the Attorney General’s office nevertheless appealed to the Virginia 
Supreme Court, where it again lost.4 Although Cuccinelli fell short in his case against 
UVA, the litigation nevertheless reinforced his bona fides as a candidate 
conservative enough to win the Virginia GOP’s 2013 gubernatorial primary race and 
brought renewed attention to the possibility of exposing salacious emails. This, in 
turn, prompted ATI to submit a request for Mann’s emails, this time under Virginia’s 
FOIA law.  
 ATI is a 501(c)3 organization that describes itself as a free market think tank. 
Its General Counsel, David Schnare, a former EPA employee, has served alongside 
well-known climate denialists like Myron Ebell on the Trump Transition landing 
team. Schnare’s collaborator, Chris Horner, a “Senior Fellow” at the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, an organization with ties to the coal industry, is the Senior 
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Legal Fellow at ATI, “where he provides strategic and legal counsel on cases 
involving Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) filings and government 
transparency.”5  
 After ATI submitted its public records request, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS), AAUP, and the ACLU asked UVA President Teresa Sullivan to invoke 
exemptions under the state FOIA law to protect Mann’s emails from being released 
(States News Service 2011a). The records that are exempt from the open records 
law include  
data, records or information of a proprietary nature produced or 
collected by or for faculty or staff of public institutions of higher 
education, other than the institutions’ financial or administrative 
records, in the conduct of or as a result of study or research on 
medical, scientific, technical or scholarly issues, whether sponsored 
by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or 
a private concern, where such data, records or information has not 
been publicly released, published, copyrighted or patented (Virginia 
Code § 2.2-3705.4(4)). 
 
Disagreement formed between ATI and UVA over the meaning of “proprietary,” with 
the university arguing that it should be interpreted broadly and ATI arguing 
otherwise. With both sides at an impasse, the trial court ordered that UVA label as 
proprietary whichever emails in its possession it deemed so and then to produce 
them 
in a form to be agreed upon between the parties . . . [so that ATI 
would] have 90 days after receipt of the Exempt Information to 
review it, negotiate with the Respondents, and if they choose, file a 
petition with the Court for in camera review for determination as to 
whether the Respondent properly designated the records as Exempt 
Information (American Tradition Institute, et al. v. Rector and Visitors 
of the University of Virginia, et al. 2014 at 4). 
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At about the same time that the trial court required both sides to settle their 
disagreement under the FOIA law, Mann received support from the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), publisher of the journal Science, 
which denounced the “personal attacks,” “harassment,” “death threats,” and “legal 
challenges” that Mann was being subjected to (PR Newswire 2011b; Foster 2011).  
 That fall, Mann received additional support when Scott Mandia of Suffolk 
County Community College formed what became the Climate Science Legal Defense 
Fund (CSLDF) (State News Service 2011c; Hurley 2011). Within 24 hours of writing 
a letter to his colleagues to solicit money in support of Mann’s legal defense, Mandia 
raised $10,000 from the scientific community, which grew to $30,000 by January 
2012. In addition to providing financial support, CSLDF formed relationships with 
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), which had the 
organizational capacity to do things that CSLDF could not. PEER organized a 
network of law firms that pledged legal services to embattled scientists throughout 
the United States (Jamieson 2012), which allowed Mann to file a motion to intervene 
in UVA’s case, arguing that his former employer could not alone protect his 
“interests in privacy, academic freedom, and free speech,” a motion that was granted 
that November (American Tradition Institute 2014 at 5).  
 Almost a year passed, and, the following September, Prince William County 
Circuit Court Judge Paul Sheridan ruled in favor of Mann and UVA (Jackman 2012). 
ATI appealed the circuit court decision to the Virginia Supreme Court, where the 
state’s highest court was tasked with determining what was meant by “proprietary.” 
Mann’s legal team argued that if the definition of “proprietary” proffered by ATI was 
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adopted by the court, then it followed that Virginia’s General Assembly must have 
intended a narrow definition of “proprietary” while fully aware that a narrow 
definition of the term would cause the commonwealth’s public universities to suffer 
competitively against private universities. To advance its argument, UVA’s Vice 
President and Provost John Simon, who at one time served as a Vice-Provost at Duke 
University, submitted an affidavit that the Court relied upon in making its ruling. 
Simon wrote,  
Scientists at private institutions such as Duke, where I previously 
worked, that are not subject to state freedom of information statutes, 
will not feel that it is possible to continue collaborations with 
scientists at public institutions if doing so means that every email or 
other written communication discussing data, preliminary results, 
drafts of papers, review of grant proposals, or other research related 
activities is subject to public release under a state FOIA in 
contravention of scholarly norms and expectations of privacy and 
confidentiality. . . . I can state unequivocally that recruitment of faculty 
to an institution like the University of Virginia will be deeply harmed 
if such faculty must fear that their unpublished communications with 
their scientific collaborators and scholarly colleagues are subject to 
involuntary disclosure (American Tradition Institute 2014 at 15-16). 
 
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Mann’s emails fell under the 
ordinary meaning of the term “proprietary” and that the legislature never could 
have intended to place the commonwealth’s public institutions at a competitive 
disadvantage against private ones. The Court specifically found that  
competitive disadvantage implicates . . . harm to university-wide 
research efforts, damage to faculty recruitment and retention, 
undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and confidentiality, 
and impairment of free thought and expression (American Tradition 
Institute 2014 at 15). 
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This high-profile legal victory in Virginia gave American scientists the national 
recognition needed to draw more attention to their efforts to protect the integrity of 
the research process.  
After the Virginia case, climate researchers continued building the additional 
capacity needed to win future legal battles against climate change deniers, who 
were increasingly turning to the courts. In 2015, for instance, the UCS’s Michael 
Halpern produced a 20-page report through its Center for Science and Democracy 
called “Freedom to Bully: How Laws Intended to Free Information are used to 
Harass Researchers,” which detailed examples of egregious “open records attacks” 
and how “[s]nooping on researchers’ email has become the twenty-first century 
equivalent of tapping their phone lines or bugging a lab’s water cooler” (3). Most 
importantly, the litigation campaign against climate researchers produced the 
CSLDF, which now uses Columbia Law School as its mailing address and has grown 
to a staff of four. 
 
C. E&E Legal vs. Jonathan Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes 
Michael Mann’s success in Virginia did not stop ATI from using open records 
statutes to request emails from others who were associated with Mann and the 
professional community of climate scientists. ATI changed its name to the Energy & 
Environmental Legal Institute (E&E Legal) and then set its sights on Jonathan 
Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes, two prominent climate scientists from the 
University of Arizona, who E&E Legal claimed “were prominently featured in two 
separate [email] releases in 2009 and 2011 known colloquially as ‘Climategate’” 
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(Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2014 at 4). In Arizona, public records are 
made available to “inspection by any person and at all times” (A.R.S. § 39-121). 
Under this law, E&E Legal submitted an open records request to the University of 
Arizona for a period from 1999 to 2006,6 producing 1,600 pages of documents that 
were submitted to the organization and over 1,700 that, “due to considerations of 
privacy, confidentiality, academic freedom, and the competition for and retention of 
faculty members, and other factors,” were withheld (Energy & Environmental Legal 
Institute v Arizona Board of Regents, et al. 2015b at 4). E&E Legal promptly sued the 
Arizona Board of Regents (AzBOR) for the 1,700 emails, arguing that disputes raised 
under the Arizona public records statute should always be resolved with the 
presumption being in favor of disclosing public records, unless the state can 
demonstrate that the delivery of the records will cause material harm. E&E Legal, 
furthermore, argued that “generalized” claims of academic freedom are “insufficient 
as a matter of law” (Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2014 at 13). Its 
attorneys argued,  
that the chilling effect cited by AzBOR is contrary to fundamental 
scientific principles of openness and transparency which promote 
public confidence in scientific research…[and that the benefits of] the 
content of the contested emails to the public at large greatly exceeds 
any potential reduction in collaboration between some scientists and 
professors at public universities (Energy & Environmental Legal 
Institute v Arizona Board of Regents, et al. 2015a). 
 
E&E Legal, furthermore, argued that AzBOR had abused its discretion and acted in 
an arbitrary or capricious matter by not disclosing the emails (Energy & 
Environmental Legal Institute 2015a). 
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Hughes and Overpeck, however, responded that the open records requests 
were intrusive and time intensive. In an affidavit filed with the court, Professor 
Hughes (2014), who was Mann’s co-author, explained that complying with the open 
records request,  
was and continues to be a very burdensome and dispiriting task that 
diverted my energies and attention from productive work to a notable 
degree. The task of reviewing my emails for information responsive to 
Petitioner’s broad demands took at least ten weeks of my time. . . . 
This E&E matter deprived me of one of the small handful of summers 
remaining in my career. Given my general level of activity, this is a 
significant loss, not only to me professionally, but also to my 
department at the UA (4-5).  
 
Furthermore, Hughes described in his affidavit how public records requests had 
impacted his collaboration with others. He testified that,  
I have been directly informed by several colleagues that they have 
limited their email communications with me because I have been 
targeted in public records requests. As email is the essential medium 
of scientific cooperation in the modern world, there is no doubt that 
this chilling effect has been an obstacle to collaboration (Hughes 2014, 
8-9).  
 
In addition to his claim that the open records requests had interfered with his ability 
to collaborate with others, Hughes also testified that these requests undermined 
principles of academic freedom at public universities. His affidavit included a 
reference to a letter he sent to UVA’s president Teresa Sullivan in support of Mann, 
in which he wrote,  
Nothing is more likely to squash the creativity of America’s scientists 
than the ever-present ear of a hostile listener intent on finding, at all 
costs, the appearance of malfeasance. Nothing is more calculated to 
discourage research into topics that may challenge powerful interests 
than the telephone tap, or its modern cousin the carefully cherry-
picked phrase in one out of thousands of emails. . . . It is indeed the 
modern ‘hostile ear’ (Hughes 2014, 9). 
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In support of this testimony, the University of Arizona, in arguing against disclosure 
of the records, claimed that “the basis for not producing these documents is that to 
do so would have a chilling effect on the ability and likelihood of professors and 
scientists engaging in frank exchanges of ideas and information” (Energy & 
Environmental Legal Institute 2015a at 3). 
In addition to hearing these arguments, Pima County Superior Court Judge 
James Marner examined a collection of ninety representative emails, which ranged 
from one page to over 800 pages in length, and described them as so “technical and 
esoteric” that he was not “able to fully comprehend the substance of [them]” 
(Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2015a at 1). He ruled that AzBOR had not 
abused its discretion to withhold the emails, a decision that E&E Legal appealed to 
the Arizona Court of Appeals that same year. This time, the appellate court ruled 
that the standard of review of placing the burden on E&E Legal to persuade the 
court of disclosure was wrongly chosen. Rather, the appellate court ruled, the trial 
judge should have weighed whether the “disclosure of the records would be 
detrimental to the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of 
disclosure” (Energy & Environmental Institute 2015b at 8). In response to this ruling, 
the case was remanded back to the Pima County Superior Court where, on June 14, 
2016, Judge Marner ruled under the alternative standard of review that Overpeck 
and Hughes were compelled to produce their email correspondence and deliver it to 
E&E Legal. Judge Marner wrote, 
…the Court finds that AzBOR has not met its burden justifying its 
decision to withhold the subject emails. In making this finding, the 
Court does not ignore the repeated “chilling effect” concerns raised in 
the affidavits and in the pleadings. However, the Court concludes that 
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this potential harm is speculative at best, and does not overcome the 
presumption favoring disclosure of public records containing 
information about a topic as important and far-reaching as global 
warming and its potential causes. . . . [AzBOR goes] beyond 
championing academic freedom and, in effect, promotes the creation 
of an academic privilege exception to [the Arizona open records law]. 
This is a proposition more properly made to the legislature rather 
than the courts (Energy & Environmental Legal Institute v Arizona 
Board of Regents, et al. 2016 at 4). 
 
The not-yet-resolved Arizona litigation raises a key, yet unanswered, empirical 
question about the effect of disclosure on the research activities of public employees 
at universities: to what extent do these open records campaigns affect the research 
activities, including those relating to speech, of public university researchers?  
 While the open records campaigns in Virginia and Arizona represent two 
high-profile efforts by ATI to release scholarly correspondence, a PBS Frontline 
documentary called Climate of Doubt demonstrates how numerous climate 
researchers across the country are now being targeted by these campaigns. That is 
why it is critically important to learn more about the empirical effect of FOIA 
requests on the day-to-day activities of university professors and researchers. If 
there is support for the legal claims of climate researchers and public universities 
that open records requests of research and email correspondence (1) can place 
public universities at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private institutions, (2) will have a 
chilling effect on university professors in their deliberations with colleagues, and/or 
(3) will take away time that would ordinarily be spent conducting research for the 
public, then I should expect to see evidence of those claims during in-depth personal 
interviews with public university researchers and professors who have experienced 
these requests. In order to collect empirical evidence concerning the effect of these 
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FOIA requests, I conducted personal interviews with twelve university researchers 
and professors who have been asked to comply with open records requests for 
scholarly correspondence.   
      
III. Methodology 
 
 To understand the extent to which open records request campaigns affect the 
behavior of public university professors, I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with researchers and scientists to learn more about the experiences of those having 
to comply with them. It became immediately evident that I would only be able to 
determine the impact of these open records requests by increasing my sample size 
to include, in addition to climate scientists, other researchers and scientists who 
have been asked to comply with these requests. I therefore widened my sampling 
strategy to include all researchers who have experienced requests for scholarly 
correspondence on some matter of public policy.7 Doing so allowed me to increase 
the number of observations, making it possible to “transform an intractable problem 
that has an indeterminate research design into a tractable one” (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994, 208). While it is reasonable to assume that university researchers 
outside of the climate research network will report similar experiences as climate 
researchers in my interviews, I am nevertheless careful to describe when a 
participant is one of the three climate researchers that are part of my sample when 
reporting my interview data.  
 Qualitative research designs that examine a limited number of in-depth 
observations typically employ a purposive sampling method (e.g., Fenno 1978). 
Given the challenges of increasing the sample size of my pool of interviewees, I 
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employed a diverse sampling strategy that required (1) identifying researchers who 
were publicly identified as having been required to comply with an open records 
request and (2) recruiting participants through listservs of both the Law & Courts 
Section of the American Political Science Association and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). After each interview, I employed a snowball 
sampling strategy where participants were asked to identify additional recipients of 
open records requests. This type of sampling strategy is often used when “studying 
a relatively select, rare, or difficult-to-locate population” (Johnson, Reynolds, and 
Mycoff 2016, 229). In all, I completed twelve in-depth phone interviews with 
respondents who reported having been asked to comply with an open records 
request, including three climate researchers and nine others specializing in the 
fields of labor studies, biotechnology, political science, and public health.  
I used a semi-structured interview approach while asking respondents 
questions during my interviews. Semi-structured interviews typically involve a 
structured set of questions, but also allow investigators to ask follow-up questions 
and to clarify points that are made by respondents (Obasogie 2014). The 
confidential interviews, which last no less than thirty minutes and no longer than 
one hour, involved questions relating to the time spent complying with FOIA 
requests, the effect of FOIA requests on relationships with colleagues both inside 
and outside of the university, and the effect of the requests on activities relating to 
how the respondents express research findings and viewpoints both within and 
outside of academic settings. In light of the fact that my interview respondents were 
professionals who had experienced an intrusion of privacy, I recognized the 
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importance of masking the identities of interviewees as soon as I began transcribing 
the audio-recorded interviews (Kvale 1996). In some cases, these individuals had 
already had the experience of being thrust into the public spotlight through no 
choice of their own. In order to reassure my respondents that their audio recorded 
interviews would not be discoverable by an open records request through my 
university, I immediately transcribed the interviews verbatim and deleted the audio 
recording.8 Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the coding scheme 
employed for this study was straightforward: initial reactions upon learning about 
the open records requests were coded as positive, negative, and neutral; the time 
burden of complying with the request was coded as minimal, moderate, or 
disruptive; respondents’ reported changes in communication patterns in response 
to the requests were coded as changing to non-official email accounts, changing to 
more phone calls to avoid email use, changing to become more cognizant of what is 
written in emails, and no effect; whether respondents reported experiencing an 
academic chilling effect was coded as either having a chilling effect or having no 
chilling effect; and the effect of the information request on collaboration with peers 
outside of the university was coded as either having an effect or having no effect. 
 Before sharing the empirical results of these interviews with FOIA request 
recipients, it is important to note at the outset that one shortcoming of my sampling 
strategy is that I may only be speaking with researchers who are willing to share 
their experiences with me. For instance, I suspect that I may have undersampled 
researchers whose negative experiences may have kept them from speaking with 
me. One person who chose not to participate, for example, was concerned that 
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participating in the interview would cause the organization that had originally filed 
an open records request against her to retaliate. If my sample of participants 
includes only researchers who are willing to speak about their experiences, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that the personal interviews that I have collected so far 
might represent a “best-case-scenario” as it relates to the effect of FOIA requests. 
Furthermore, the respondents that have been interviewed are sharing perceptions 
with me, and so the interview responses may not accurately reflect the underlying 
effects of having experienced a FOIA request. In other words, the insights that are 
drawn from my interview should be interpreted with caution because they might 
understate the empirical effect of open records requests on the activities of 
university researchers. With this caveat having been made clear, I turn now to the 
interview results.  
  
IV. Evidence of FOIA Request Effects from Interviews with University 
Professors. 
 
A. Initial Reactions after Learning about Information Requests. 
 
 While working to understand the effect of FOIA requests on university 
professors, I was interested in learning more about the range of emotions that 
researchers experience after learning about a FOIA request for the first time. If the 
initial reaction to learning about a FOIA request was negative or positive, then I 
expected that experience to be reflected in the participant’s response to a question 
about his or her initial reaction. One participant described anxiety after initially 
learning about the request, responding, 
My first impression was that [a group that disagreed with my 
research] was issuing the FOIA request and they had been publicly not 
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nice to me [in the past]. They’ve attacked me in public with press 
releases and website stuff, and I decided to take the high road. But my 
first impression was that they were escalating something, and I was 
uncomfortable with the FOIA request because of that at first (Personal 
Interview #1). 
 
One climate researcher described experiencing panic after learning about the 
request but then experiencing a completely different range of emotions. This 
researcher responded, 
I think you panic. You’re also mad because it was pretty clear that 
what these people were doing was using a really good law. . . . They 
weren’t trying to understand anything in particular. They were fishing 
through my emails hoping to find something that was embarrassing . . 
. so I was a little bit mad (Personal Interview #5). 
 
Another pre-tenure female scientist, who had not yet learned that an open records 
request had been made, received a phone call from her dean who wanted to arrange 
a meeting. She explained her initial reaction after having learned about the request 
by recounting the following story: 
I was scared. I was mostly scared because when the dean wants to talk 
to you and you don’t know why and they won’t put it in writing, that’s 
kind of a big deal. . . . To be honest, even though I have never done 
anything wrong, I was scared and angry (Personal Interview #10). 
 
 Yet another climate researcher expressed shock at being asked to comply with a 
FOIA request:  
Why is this happening? I’m a scientist, I’m trying to understand how 
the Earth works, I’m not trying to do anything that’s political. . . . I 
understand that this has become a political football, but that doesn’t 
mean I’m doing anything related to that, so it was shocking because I 
never thought that I would be FOIA’d for that kind of information 
(Personal Interview #6). 
 
While shock and panic might best describe the initial reactions from university 
researchers, others reported being confused about what to do after receiving a FOIA 
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request. One climate researcher was especially confused because, after receiving a 
FOIA request for the first time, the researcher was working as part of a network of 
state and federal institutions. The researcher explained, 
It was unclear if I had to comply [with the request]. What really was 
horrible was that I contacted [my organization’s] attorney and their 
general counsel. They didn’t know what to do. I contacted the 
university counsel. They didn’t know what to do. Then I contacted 
[another organization’s] general counsel. They made the request, so 
they kept telling me, “Oh just hand them over and we will decide 
what’s discoverable.” It got bad enough that I almost thought about 
getting my own attorney because of this (Personal Interview #3). 
 
While a number of researchers were initially confused when first notified that their 
records were requested, others described the requests as a nuisance. Public 
employees who interpreted the requests as a nuisance also explained that the 
organization requesting their records was doing so as part of a “fishing expedition” 
or a “witchhunt.” One participant explained, 
. . . it was a pain in the ass having to deal with this when there were 
real things I was working on. When I say that this is harassment, one 
of the things is that they want to have you occupied with responding 
to them rather than doing the substantive work that you are doing. 
When I say that it is a fishing expedition, its because it was—the 
[search] terms [requested] had no obvious relationship to each other 
and included lots of terms that had nothing at all to do with my work, 
so it was obviously clear to me that this was not an inquiry into a 
specific thing but was a “let’s see what we can find and let’s harass 
him to do all this searching for us.” So that was my initial reaction: this 
is a pain in the ass (Personal Interview #7).  
 
The insights that were drawn from my interviews with women in the 
profession also shed light on the differential impact of these requests on their 
workplace experiences. I had the opportunity to interview three women in the 
profession who experienced these requests, and two out of the three women used 
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the analogy of having a stranger rummaging through their underwear drawers to 
describe their experiences. One described it this way: 
Ridiculous how many emails we had to go through. Hundreds of 
thousands of emails, which—just knowing anyone is going through 
your email line by line is very uncomfortable. It’s like someone 
rustling through your underwear drawer. You know it’s all clean, but 
you don’t want anybody doing it, right? (Personal Interview #12). 
   
Another researcher described the experience as “like someone is digging through 
my underwear drawer, but all I have in my underwear drawer is underwear, and in 
the end everyone wears underwear” (Personal Interview #10). All three of the 
women in the profession that I interviewed reported having experienced violations 
of privacy as part of their efforts to comply with these information requests.  
Yet, not all of the reactions to learning about FOIA requests were negative. 
One participant had experienced FOIA requests multiple times due to having a 
history of employment in government. This employee took the information request 
in stride, and explained how the request actually “set the record straight”: 
In some ways I was thankful for the opportunity to set the record 
straight to show [the requestor], #1 that [the requestor] had written 
several blog posts about how I . . . was only teaching one course in the 
fall semester and I was able to document that that was not the case. . . . 
It really gave me a chance to document a bunch of stuff [my 
requestor] would have never seen just by looking at the [university] 
website. I kind of thought it was, in the end, sort of a good thing 
because it kind of shut [my requestor] up (Personal Interview #2). 
 
Overall, eleven out of twelve of my participants reported experiences that can be 
described as negative—words like “shock,” “panic,” “scared,” “nuisance,” 
“harassment,” “disturbed,” “upset,” “worried,” and “confusion” were all used— after 
initially learning about these information requests, while only one of my 
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participants expressed a positive experience of being able to “set the record 
straight.”  
 
B. The Time Burden of FOIA Requests 
 
 When litigants challenge open records requests through the courts, they 
usually claim that FOIA requests take away time that they would ordinarily be able 
to spend with students, in research, or on service-related activities. In the affidavit 
signed by Malcolm Hughes (2014), he claimed to have spent an inordinate amount 
of time attempting to comply with E&E Legal’s open records request. It is clear that 
researchers, such as Professor Hughes, who legally challenge these requests will 
spend more time on them than those who do not, and so it is important to note that 
all but one of my participants did not formally challenge these requests in court. 
Furthermore, some universities assign an employee to serve as the custodian of 
public records so that if there is an information request, it is an administrator, 
attorney, or staff member who fulfills the request.  
 My research participants reported a range of responses when asked about 
the time they spent complying with FOIA requests, and their answers depended on 
the extent to which administrators were responsible for compliance and the number 
of exceptions that were articulated in the state open records law. One respondent 
described the time spent complying with the request as a “minor nuisance” 
(Personal Interview #2). When asked if it took away from time spent with students, 
research, or service the respondent replied,  
Really none at all. . . . I probably spent an hour on the phone with the 
lawyer. Maybe two phone conversations—a total of an hour. And then 
probably another hour collecting the records that [the administrator] 
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needed from me. So it was just a miniscule part of over a two-week 
period (Personal Interview #2).  
 
Another respondent reported that it had a “minor effect,” requiring only “two to 
three hours” to comply (Personal Interview #1). When administrators were 
responsible for collecting the emails and addressing the legal issues associated with 
the request, some of the researchers I spoke with reported that the requests had a 
very minor effect on the time they spent on their work-related responsibilities. One 
climate scientist responded,  
It had essentially no impact on [teaching, research, or service]. . . . I’ve 
heard stories about people having to spend like a summer going 
through emails. I didn’t do any of that. The IT people downloaded the 
email, they searched all the keywords, and they gave them to the 
general counsel’s office. I probably had to spend maybe a total of a day 
or two days sort of dealing with legal issues (Personal Interview #5).    
 
 Others, however, reported spending far more time complying with the 
request, and this might be due to the sophistication of the groups making the 
requests. One climate scientist reported,  
It took me three days culling through my own personal laptop just to 
make sure, did I have anything? That was really frustrating because it 
felt like such a waste of time. . . . . It was a witch-hunt, and it just was 
ridiculous (Personal Interview #3).    
 
Another climate researcher reported that searching through emails to submit to the 
university in fulfillment of a FOIA request 
took two or three days of my time basically—many thousands of 
emails—because being on the IPCC assessment, particularly, I had 
been doing numerous emails everyday. It was later determined by the 
way that none of those emails connected with IPCC were even 
allowable because it was a report in progress . . . But nonetheless I had 
to spend a lot of time going through all those. I don’t know how much 
time it ate up but it was certainly a week to ten days. So what 
happened [was] the university went back to . . . the lawyer and said 
you have to narrow the request because you can’t be making such a 
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broad thing over such a long period of time. We’re talking about 
thousands of emails here, so the lawyer then came back with a smaller 
request. So I had to go through them again and extract out what was 
for that time period. We ended up doing that three different times, 
until we finally got things. All in all, I don’t know how much time it 
cost me. Probably several weeks of my time. Plus some heartburn 
having to deal with this [laughs] (Personal Interview #6).  
 
There were others not involved in climate research who described the email 
requests as disruptive to their research efforts. One participant explained,  
I had probably fifteen hours worth of meetings with my department 
chair, with the university lawyer, with the faculty union 
representative. There are only so many hours in a week. I already, to 
be honest, work about eighty-five to ninety hours a week. Those 
fifteen hours had to come from somewhere, so it was less time doing 
research because usually when students are standing at the door you 
don’t ignore them (Personal Interview #10).   
 
Another researcher estimated that it took eighty hours to comply with one FOIA 
request, while the smaller requests tended to take between six to ten hours. Overall, 
of the twelve participants who were interviewed, four participants (Interviewees 
#1, #2, #7, and #8) reported that requests had, at most, a moderate effect on the 
time they spent on teaching, research, and services activities; one participant 
(Interviewee #5) described it as having an effect because they spent a couple of days 
addressing the legal issues; and seven participants (Interviewees #3, #4, #6, #9, 
#10, #11, and #12) described the requests as very disruptive. 
 
C. Altering Methods of Communication 
 
 As part of my research about the effect of FOIA requests, I am also interested 
in how these requests change the behavior of employees working for the public. If 
FOIA requests alter the communication patterns of university researchers, then I 
expect to see that reflected in the responses of my research participants. The fact 
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that public universities provide email systems, in some cases, means that 
information that becomes part of university servers is in the public domain. Yet if 
scholars alter their means of communication in response to an information request, 
perhaps by switching to a private email system, then it is possible that these altered 
behaviors will eliminate legitimate public information, which would further prevent 
information of public interest from ever reaching the public domain.  
 In my interviews, I learned that my research participants reported seeking 
new ways of communicating with others. One research participant began using the 
“direct message” function on Twitter to communicate the results of research that 
had policy implications (Personal Interview #1). Another “set up a separate Gmail 
account for correspondence with people that could possibly be political in nature. So 
I have two email accounts. One with my [university] account, and the other one is a 
Gmail [account]” (Personal Interview #4). One climate researcher began avoiding 
email correspondence altogether after experiencing a FOIA request. According to 
this participant, “I make a lot more phone calls than I used to, that’s the truth. 
Honestly, in emails there are just certain things . . . [to avoid] when we know that 
there is something that is gonna be a touchy issue” (Personal Interview #3). 
Conducting business over the phone became a common theme among researchers in 
the profession. One put it this way: “We preferred to do direct phone or some other 
source that couldn’t be FOIA’d just to avoid the hassle” (Personal Interview #12). 
 While the four participants above actually changed the medium used for 
communication, others began self-censoring their correspondence with others when 
using email. One participant became “more conscious of the need for being 
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scrupulous about not communicating in a non-official [university] way on my official 
[university] account” (Personal Interview #2). A climate researcher reported 
avoiding telling jokes via email:  
[The request] does make me more careful about what I write in 
emails. My working assumption now is anything I write could be 
released, so I don’t make jokes in emails like I may have done 
previously. . . . I don’t do that because someone might think I’m being 
serious or something like that (Personal Interview #5).  
 
One participant described imagining “a lawyer from the [requestor’s] industry 
looking over my shoulder” when writing emails (Personal Interview #11). One 
climate researcher explained that,  
I don’t put things in emails that could be misconstrued. [I’m] 
[c]ertainly more cautious about emails, particularly in joking around, 
as I often do. Just to make sure there wasn’t something that 
somebody’s gonna take out of context (Personal Interview #6).  
 
The same participant went on to express concern about other researchers who 
might be subjected to FOIA requests,  
I think I get more concerned about others. . . . In emails with [other 
climate researchers] I would be a little careful in sticking to the topic 
because we knew it was likely to be FOIA’d. But it didn’t keep me from 
discussing the science or anything; it really was just being a little 
careful to say things that wouldn’t be taken out of context. . . . There’s 
various colleagues I knew [who] had been FOIA’d or were likely to be 
FOIA’d, including one of my former students . . . who I interact with a 
lot still. I just have to be a little more careful, but it really hasn’t 
affected what science I do at all. I don’t allow it to (Personal Interview 
#6). 
 
Some researchers became more careful about disseminating data via email than 
they had in the past, with one researcher describing it this way: 
I think if a colleague has asked me to send some data or send a file or 
whatever I would have very easily done that. Now, since I’m worried 
that it can just be grabbed and taken out of context by a FOIA request, 
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I’m very reluctant to send those sorts of things by email. I’ve saved 
data differently than I used to (Personal Interview #12). 
 
My interviews with participants shed more light on the effect of FOIA requests on 
their day-to-day communication patterns in the workplace. Three participants 
reported using nonofficial university means for communicating (Interviewees #1, 
#4, and #7), four participants described addressing “touchy” matters or business 
over the phone to avoid an email record (Interviewees #3, #8, #10, #11, and #12), 
and six reported becoming more cognizant of how they are communicating 
information using public email systems (Interviewees #2, #5, #6, #10, #11, and 
#12). 
 
D. Communicating Research via Email 
 
 In the litigation surrounding open records requests, organizations like the 
AAUP and the UCS argue that the request for researchers’ email correspondence is 
likely to have a chilling effect on how researchers deliberate about the policy 
implications of their research. In fact, Malcolm Hughes and several other 
researchers who have challenged open records requests have testified about having 
themselves experienced a chilling effect due to these requests.  
If open records requests for the personal correspondence of university 
researchers do, in fact, have a chilling effect on how researchers deliberate via 
email, then I expect my research participants to describe those changes in their 
responses. While above I have shown how several respondents reported altering the 
methods by which they communicate with others, I learned during my interviews 
that FOIA requests, no matter how intrusive, did not alter the way many of my 
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participants communicated their research findings. Five participants (Interviews 
#2, #3, #4, #6, and #9) unequivocally responded that the open records requests had 
no impact on how they communicate their research findings with others via email. 
Here is one of the responses from a climate researcher:  
I can honestly say [that the request did not change the way I 
communicate research]. . . . I’ve always been in the realm of policy 
relevance, but not policy perspectives. . . . I won’t say, “because of X 
result, thou shalt do this.” I will say, “Here’s a tradeoff related to 
different decisions one might make from a scientific perspective.” I’ve 
always been like that. . . . I just don’t wanna look like an asshole 
(Personal Interview #3). 
 
One participant described being more “careful about saying things that are within 
the bounds of my empirical findings” (Personal Interview #1), while one climate 
scientist explained,  
As I said before, it makes me a little more careful when I write email. I 
carefully consider what I’m gonna say with the assumption that it will 
be released at some point. If it never is, fine. But if it is, then I didn’t 
say anything stupid. It hasn’t at all changed [how I communicate 
research findings] (Personal Interview #5). 
 
Nine of my interviews did not report actually having experienced a chilling effect on 
scholarly inquiry or discourse about research findings. In one case, the request 
actually emboldened the participant, a climate researcher, who explained,  
I have a very low threshold for outrage. When you do climate science 
its easy to get outraged at the people who are fighting against the 
science and trying to stop scientists from working. So, if anything, [the 
request] sort of incentivized me to do even more (Personal Interview 
#5). 
 
Even though the majority of my research participants did not find that open records 
requests led them to suppress their ideas, one of my respondents reported having 
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become more cautious about responding to emails from the general public. This 
participant explained, 
I have been even more cautious than I was before about who I do 
interviews with; I sometimes assume that emails that come from 
people that I don’t know who they are, are traps to try to trick me into 
saying something that would be inflammatory. I feel uncomfortable 
talking (Personal Interview #10).  
 
Another participant described being less open about expressing research ideas. The 
participant described it this way:  
It changes my openness I guess. The ease with which I would talk 
about the research that I’m doing. You’d think that you’d want to do 
that without worrying about it. You talk about research ideas and 
findings and what you think about this or that. But I just have to be 
really careful I think in communications (Personal Interview #11).  
 
All but one of my research participants did not legally challenge the open records 
requests, and so it may be possible that those choosing to legally challenge open 
records requests are more likely to experience chilling effects. The one participant 
who challenged the open records request in court did report the request having a 
chilling effect both in how research findings were communicated and in the extent 
to which the participant engaged in “political activity . . . outside of work” (Personal 
Interview #[Redacted]9). Furthermore, it is worth reminding the reader that my 
collection of interviews have been drawn from participants who are willing to 
describe their experiences to me. It is possible that those choosing not to participate 
made that decision on the basis of having experienced a chilling effect. 
 
E. Collaborating with Peers from Private Institutions 
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 One negative effect of FOIA requests that is regularly cited by supporters of 
climate scientists is that collaboration between public and private researchers will 
suffer if emails from private institutions are caught up in information requests 
against researchers from public institutions. In fact, both the affidavit filed by 
Hughes (2014) and the testimony received during the Mann litigation in Virginia 
suggest that public university professors will be less likely to collaborate with their 
peers at private universities because doing so would require private university 
researchers to correspond and share data over public technology systems. I 
expected to see evidence of that when asking my research participants about their 
ability to collaborate with others in the aftermath of FOIA requests, yet none of my 
research participants gave examples of collaboration suffering as a consequence of 
having experienced a FOIA request.  
 
   
V. Discussion and Conclusion. 
 
 By mobilizing open records campaigns against university scientists, it can be 
argued that conservative legal groups have adopted the same tactics as their liberal 
public interest forbears. Opponents argue that these campaigns burden the speech 
rights of university professors and interfere with their professional obligation to 
generate new forms of knowledge. That is why I set out to learn about the 
consequences of these tactics. I found through my personal interviews that 
researchers overwhelmingly report negative experiences after having first learned 
about a FOIA request, in response to which they adopt new forms of communication 
to avoid material from being made a matter of public record. They also, depending 
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on who is responsible for fulfilling these requests, incur significant time burdens 
that interfere with the production of research and knowledge.  
 This is critically important because today’s complex environmental problems 
are knowledge intensive and require the generation of information on a scale never 
before seen. The consequences caused by the execution of these tactics, moreover, 
are borne by a small group of public university researchers whose generation of 
knowledge serves a broad public purpose in addressing the difficult environmental 
problems that confront today’s citizens and that will be passed on to future 
generations. The requests not only interfere with the production of knowledge but 
also impose the additional burden of placing public universities at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis private institutions. If anti-reflexive groups are successful in their 
continued assault on knowledge generation at public universities, it is possible that 
resources for impact science will shift to privately-held institutions where access to 
knowledge is more limited than in public institutions.  
 This study of the legal mobilization of conservative public interest groups has 
additional implications for theories of legal mobilization. Legal mobilization 
theorists have shown how resorting to legal instruments can democratize the policy 
process by opening venues to political participation that were once closed and can 
be a powerful symbol for the marginalized as they work to make rights-based claims 
(McCann 1994). Open records laws were designed to facilitate access and 
participation in these venues (e.g., Harrington and Carter 2015), but it appears that 
today they have become a tool used by CCCM groups to manufacture doubt in fields 
of impact science. If this is a tactic that is commonly being used by CCCM groups, 
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then one can expect that these tactics will be adopted in other policy areas where 
scientists are actively generating knowledge to address today’s complex challenges. 
Yet the conclusions that can be drawn from my interviews suggest that open 
records campaigns have not dramatically affected deliberation among researchers, 
who continue to interpret data and report their findings. Rather, the norms of 
careful scientific deliberation appear to be so strong that they are withstanding the 
threat posed by these litigation campaigns. While I did not find evidence of across-
the-board chilling effects on academic research, the frequency or magnitude of 
chilling effects is not dispositive of the potentially negative impact of open records 
laws on the academic research process. Scholarly breakthroughs might, for instance, 
be stunted by the self-censorship of a reluctant collaborator who opts against 
making the kind of impulsive, off-the-wall, or controversial interpretation through 
email that might otherwise have the potential to spark new ideas and fundamentally 
alter and extend the frontiers of human and scientific knowledge.  
 Aside from the empirical effect of the open records campaigns being waged 
by groups like ATI, there remain important normative concerns about how these 
tactics are funded. Scholars have argued that other large-scale rights mobilization 
campaigns through the judiciary are consistent with democratic norms due to their 
association with broad-based interest groups (Epp 1998). If opaque organizations 
like DonorsTrust are funding groups like ATI to engage in these litigation 
campaigns, then it is virtually impossible to determine who is responsible for 
privately funding this strategic litigation that targets public scholarship. If it is true 
that groups like ATI do not have a broad membership base, then they are not likely 
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to possess the democratic supports that are typical of past rights-based legal 
campaigns.  
 Finally, because FOIA and litigation campaigns waged by CCCM groups and 
others who use transparency laws to comb through emails will persist, public 
universities should consider formulating policies that mitigate the negative impact 
of these requests. Several of my research participants described spending less time 
complying with open records requests when a public records custodian was 
responsible for university compliance, and so public institutions might consider 
providing institutional support for employees who are asked to comply with such 
requests. Universities might also educate new faculty members during orientation 
about state and university policy regarding public access to emails and appropriate 
email use. Lastly, it is the responsibility of faculty, and those who represent faculty, 
to understand the extent to which their state FOIA laws protect email 
correspondence and other types of proprietary information. If those laws are apt to 
be abused, then university faculty might consider asking their representatives to 
clarify those laws, as the University of Rhode Island faculty did in 2017 when it 
passed a law in Rhode Island that protects public university research.10   
 
 





                                                        
1 Kemp et al. (2010) differentiate between climate deniers and climate skeptics. According to these 
authors, while skepticism begins with an open mind and involves the weighing of evidence prior to 
acceptance of a claim, denialism involves “conviction rather than evidence. . . . Deniers use strategies 
that invoke conspiracies, quote fake experts, denigrate genuine experts, deploy evidence selectively 
and create impossible expectations of what research can deliver” (Kemp et al. 2010, 673).  
2 DonorsTrust offers financial backing to the GMUSL Law and Economics Center. For a full list of the 
donors supporting the GMUSL Law and Economics Center, see http://masonlec.org/donors/ 
(accessed 05/10/2017). 
3 According to The Free Market Environmental Law Clinic website on 09/12/2017, “the Directors of 
FME Law engaged in a friendly and supportive discussion with the Dean of the George Mason 
University School of Law and recognized that the clinic could better perform its function by servicing 
multiple law schools as a stand-alone clinic. The Board thus directed a name change to reflect this 
broadened purpose. . . . [The clinic] remains in close cooperation with George Mason University’s 
School of Law and provides both academic courses and clinical opportunities for GMU Law students 
and is expanding its externship program to other law schools that have a doctrinal focus on law and 
economics.” Website archive can be found here: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161229034021/http://fmelawclinic.org/?page_id=36 (accessed 
05/07/2018).  
4 According to the opinion of the Court, “The University of Virginia, as an agency of the 
commonwealth, does not constitute a ‘person’ under the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and therefore 
cannot be the proper subject [of a records request]” (Basken 2012). 
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